Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

2012

Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options for A New Fiscal
Architecture
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy W., "Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options for A New Fiscal Architecture" (2012). ICEPP
Working Papers. 69.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/69

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICY

International Center for Public Policy
In Working Paper 12-33
December 2012

Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options for
A New Fiscal Architecture
Roy Bahl

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 12-33

Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options
for A New Fiscal Architecture
Roy Bahl
December 2012

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 651-1144
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: hseraphin@gsu.edu
Internet: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Copyright 2006, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. No part
of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Center for Public Policy.
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy is to provide academic and professional
training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and
sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.
The International Center for Public Policy at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies is
recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through
technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a
diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government
organizations, legislative bodies and private sector institutions.
The success of the International Center for Public Policy reflects the breadth and depth of the
in-house technical expertise that the International Center for Public Policy can draw upon. The
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew
Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around the world.
Our technical assistance strategy is not to merely provide technical prescriptions for policy
reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with the host government and donor agency to
identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions and implement reforms.
The International Center for Public Policy specializes in four broad policy areas:





Fiscal policy, including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform
Fiscal decentralization, including fiscal decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental
transfer systems, urban government finance
Budgeting and fiscal management, including local government budgeting, performancebased budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting
Economic analysis and revenue forecasting, including micro-simulation, time series
forecasting,

For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html or contact us by email at
hseraphin@gsu.edu.

Metropolitan City Finances in India: Options
for A New Fiscal Architecture1
Roy Bahl
Andrew Young School of Policy studies, Georgia State University

1

Roy Bahl is Regents Professor of Economics, Emeritus, The Andrew Young School of Policy studies, Georgia State
University, Atlanta Georgia, USA. (rbahl@gsu.edu).

1

2

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

INTRODUCTION
India will face great problems in finding a way to finance public services in its
large cities in the next two decades. Backlogs in service levels and infrastructure
are already great, and migration to urban areas will put even more pressure on
state and local government budgets. Metropolitan cities have an economic base
of significant size, but have not been empowered to tap this revenue potential.
State governments have more ability to reach a buoyant tax base, and to borrow,
but must also use these resources to provide statewide services and to tend to
the servicing needs of poorer local governments. The Indian Constitution poses
significant constraints on the financing options, and neither the Central Finance
Commission nor the State Finance Commissions have shown the way out of this
problem. One could correctly say that India has not successfully implemented a
strategy to address the fiscal problems of metropolitan areas.
The goal in this paper is to describe and evaluate some of the alternative
approaches to developing such a strategy. While most studies of urban finance in
India consider good reforms that might be politically possible, and that might lie
within the present legal framework (Rao and Bird, 2011: Mohanty, et. al., 2007;
High Powered Committee, 2011), this analysis focuses on the largest metropolitan
cities and considers the option of state government status for large metropolitan
areas.
We begin with a discussion of the factors driving the budgetary needs that will
face big cities in the next twenty years and then turn to a review of the options
for covering the growing resource gap that will emerge. Three of these reform
choices are the usual suspects: muddling through with the present approach,
giving urban local governments access to more revenue raising powers, and
increasing the rate of intergovernmental transfers from both the central and the
state governments. The fourth, less often discussed reform path is to give state
government status to the largest metropolitan cities. Throughout the paper we
draw on the recent experiences in middle and low income countries. While every
country is unique, there are lessons for India to learn from the international
experience in financing urban governments.
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DETERMINANTS OF THE URBAN FINANCING PROBLEM2
Urbanization and the public financing and governance adjustments that it will call
out are a world-wide issue (Bahl, 2010). The expectation is that the demand for
new infrastructure and maintenance and for enhanced public services will grow
dramatically. Ingram, Liu and Brandt (forthcoming) estimate that annual urban
infrastructure needs will be equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP for new
construction and 2 percent for maintenance. The sources of this increased
demand include migration to urban areas, growing per capita incomes, business
demand for enhanced public services, and the need to upgrade slum
neighborhoods. On top of this are the needs to address the negative externalities
that come with urbanization, such as pollution (solid waste collection) and
congestion (transportation).
Population Growth.
The workers and families that will move to cities from smaller places and from
rural areas will pressure the budgets of urban local governments. The rate of
urbanization in developing countries is now projected to reach the 50 percent
mark in the next decade (United Nations, 2008). According to current estimates
the world population will likely grow from approximately 7 billion in 2012 to over
9 billion3 by 2050 and virtually all of the population increment will be absorbed by
urban areas in developing countries.
The number of megacities (population greater than 10 million) is projected to
increase from 19 now to 27 in 2025, when about 10 percent of the world’s urban
population will reside in these cities. Of the projected 27 mega-cities, 21 will be
in less developed countries. By 2025, there will be 48 cities with populations
between 5 and 10 million, and three-fourths of these will be in developing
countries (United Nations, 2008). The rate of population growth in the largest
metros may be slower than that in other urban areas, but the size of the
populations to be serviced will be larger than anything seen before.
2

For a detailed discussion of these determinants, see Bahl, Linn and Wetzel (forthcoming).
US Census Bureau Website (last accessed 21 July 2012)
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/worldpopgraph.php
3
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The distribution of population in India will follow these international trends.
Between 2001 and 2031, the urban share of total population is projected to
double, though India’s rate of urbanization will still lag that in the rest of the
world. The number of cities with populations greater than one million will
increase from 35 to 87 (High Powered Committee, 2011). The United Nations
(2008) projects that by 2025, Mumbai (26 million) and Delhi (23 million) will be
the second and third largest urban agglomerations in the world. About half of the
increase in urban population over the decade of the 1990s was due to natural
growth, but this share will fall as urban job opportunities will bid in more
migrants.
Competitiveness.
Urban economic growth (and national economic growth) is fueled by a strong
competitive position of businesses operating within the metropolitan area.
“Competitiveness” means production at lowest costs consistent with the quality
necessary to sell in international markets, but it also means an ability of urban
enterprises to absorb new technologies, take advantage of agglomeration
economies, and to attract foreign direct investment and a high quality labor force.
Maintaining competitiveness requires a setting in which innovation can take
place, e.g., technology parks, linkages with universities, and incentives for
incubation and small business development (OECD, 2006).
The competitiveness of a city’s businesses in international markets is enabled by
the infrastructure and public services offered. Transportation services have long
been recognized as a key to urban economic development. This has led to heavy
investment in mass transit and freeways that have reduced congestion, and in
seaports and airports that have facilitated trade (Yusuf, forthcoming). A
communications network that allows an efficient transfer of information is key to
all of this (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Another part of the strategy to maintain
competitiveness is to make cities more attractive to high quality labor. This leads
to public investments in improving amenities, such as provision of modern health
facilities, education curricula that support the new economy, recreational and
cultural activities, and security.
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The Indian economy is increasingly driven by its urban sector. Projections are
that the urban share of GDP will reach 75 percent by 2030. The industry and
service sectors are the primary contributors to urban economic growth,
particularly IT, telecoms, banking and “smart” manufacturing such as engineered
goods and pharmaceuticals (High Powered Committee, 2011). It is estimated that
between now and 2030, 70 percent of net new employment will be generated in
cities (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010).
As in other countries, the competitive challenge in India will be to capture the
agglomeration benefits of urbanization without being overwhelmed by
congestion costs. This will call out a strategy of investing in basic infrastructure to
allow the communication among firms that is necessary to capture the benefits of
proximity, and to attract a skilled labor force. At the same time, virtually all cities
must invest heavily in transportation to reduce congestion and air pollution. The
pressure will be on to get the government institutions arranged so that good
decisions can be made, and to mobilize the resources needed.
Poverty and Slum upgrading
Many large metropolitan areas in low and middle income countries face the
problem of addressing the special needs of a heavy concentration of poor and
badly housed families, often in sprawling slums which call for major infrastructure
investments by metropolitan governments. The magnitude of the slum problem
is staggering. One estimate is that about $60 billion per year will need to be
spent on slum improvement and prevention during the next 15 years (Freire,
forthcoming).
While the problem of urban poverty has been a focus of policy action in low and
middle income countries during the past two decades, it is also the center of
much debate. Two fundamental issues are how poverty should be measured, and
what are the relative sizes of the poor population in metropolitan cities, other
urban areas and rural areas. Another is which policy instruments are likely to
yield the greatest returns in terms of poverty reduction (Linn, 2010). This same
debate takes place about poverty in India.
5
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How will migration to urban areas in India affect the rate of poverty? About onefourth of the Indian population now lives below the poverty line, though the
share is considerably lower in urban areas.4 Moreover, the evidence suggests
that new migrants are no more likely than non-migrants to have incomes below
the poverty line (Singh, 2009)
The Indian problem in cities is probably better described as “shelter poverty”.
For example, over half the population of Mumbai lives in slum settlements which
have little by way of water or sanitation systems. A significant percent of families
living in slums is not below the poverty line, but nearly all slum dwellers live in
deplorable conditions because of lack of access to basic services. Most do not
have access to health and education services. Rao (2009) and Bandyopadhyay
and Rao (2009) cite statistics on access to services that underlines the magnitude
of the problem: only 78 percent of slum dwellers use tap water; 37 percent used
communal toilet facilities and 24 percent walked 0.2 to 0.5 km to latrine facilities;
there is a little by way of solid waste disposal; and only 84 percent of slums had
approach roads that would service motor vehicles. The price tag on servicing
these slums, even to minimum acceptable levels, is very large.

THE REVENUE SHORTFALL
The revenue needs in urban areas in low and middle income countries are well
beyond the level of resources that are typically raised from own sources. For
Infrastructure alone, the annual needs for urban areas are placed in the range of
3-5 percent of GDP annually (Ingram, Liu and Brandt, forthcoming). Estate (2010)
estimates that about 1 billion people lack clean water and perhaps 3 billion lack
access to adequate sanitation facilities. The annual infrastructure expenditure
required to meet this one local need is estimated at 2.0% of GDP in Sub-Saharan
Africa and 1.7% in South Asia, with about 40% of these amounts required for new
investment and the balance for operation and maintenance.

4

The extent of urban poverty may be understated because full account is not taken of the higher cost of essential
consumption in larger cities (Hashim, 2009).
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The level of own source revenues of subnational governments available to
address this shortfall, to support current expenditure needs and to service debt,
averages about 2.3 percent of GDP (Table 1) in low and middle income countries.
If this financing gap is to be reduced, it will need to be done with a heavy dose of
new intergovernmental transfers or with a very significant enhancement to the
revenue raising powers and efforts of urban governments, or both.
In its report on Indian urban infrastructure, the High Powered committee (2011)
estimated that new investment needs are roughly equivalent to an annual
amount equivalent to 1.1 percent of GDP by 2032. This estimated amount does
not include maintenance. Mohanty, Misra, Goyal and Jeromi (2007) estimate
annual infrastructure expenditure needs at 2 percent of GDP. The financing gap
for recurrent expenditures is no less severe in large urban areas (Bandyopadhyay
and Rao, 2009; and Mohanty, et. al., 2007). The problem is a longstanding one.
The results of the Rakesh Mohan committee for 2001 indicated shortfalls of
similar magnitude (Mohan and Dasgupta, 2004).
Revenues generated by local governments fall well short of these levels in almost
all metropolitan area governments, and there is a longstanding pattern of low
buoyancy of local government revenues (Oommen, 2000). In general, state
governments have not shown an inclination to emphasize investment in urban
areas, in part because of their weak fiscal position and in part because of the
competing needs in rural areas (Garg, 2007).
The major fiscal policy question to be addressed is how the additional revenues to
cover the shortfall will be found. In fact, there are a number of options. One way
to address the revenue shortfall in India is the inertia solution, which is the route
that countries most often take. The idea is to make policy and administration
changes around the edges but basically to continue on under the present fiscal
structure. Two other approaches could involve more sweeping changes: increase
the revenue mobilization powers and efforts of urban local governments, and/or
increase the flow of transfers from higher level governments to the urban local
governments. A much more radical approach is to enhance the revenue powers
of local governments by rethinking the place of governance in large metropolitan
7
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areas in the federal system. To varying extents, all of these approaches are taken
in various low and middle income countries.
MUDDLING THROUGH
The path of least resistance usually is to limit reform to those marginal
adjustments that might make the present system work more effectively. The very
great advantage of this approach is that it is likely to be the most politically
acceptable, it does not require the homework that a comprehensive reform might
require, and it avoids bumping up against serious legal constraints to reform. It
also has the advantage of not requiring a retooling of the local administration and
management as might be needed if the basic fiscal structure were to be changed.
Perhaps most important of all, a holding to the fiscal architecture that is laid down
in the Constitution and in federal and state laws gives a stability to the fiscal
system that subnational governments can count on in planning their budgets.
These advantages are so important that they have caused many low and middle
income countries to back away from comprehensive changes in subnational
government finance.
The muddling through approach has the great drawback of resigning large
metropolitan areas to their present trajectory of fiscal balance. If the fiscal
architecture was not designed to accommodate present day realities, its basic flaws
will continue to stand in the way of fiscal sustainability. Without a revamping of
local revenue raising powers, reassignment of expenditure responsibilities or
increased transfers, metropolitan finances will continue to be supported by the
revenues that can be generated from economic growth, and by increased
revenue effort on present sources.
Some countries have taken the path of greater resistance and have changed the
intergovernmental fiscal architecture of the country. South Africa, for example,
moved to a unitary system, and set up a new revenue mobilization scheme with
differential revenue raising powers in the hands of the metropolitan cities. The
revision called for constitutional changes as well as a redrawing of the boundaries
of metropolitan areas. These changes were possible because of a “moment in
time”, the end of apartheid and the formation of a new government. Similarly,
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Indonesia’s “big bang” decentralization was a moment in time, the aftermath of
an economic shock and the move to democratic elections. Another example of “a
moment in time” that allowed a fundamental change in the fiscal architecture was
the Chinese re-centralization in 1994.The question on the table here is whether
Indian urbanization might also be thought of as a moment in time that can justify
sweeping reform. India is an advanced democracy where political compromise
solutions in the area of reforming intergovernmental fiscal relations are more
likely than “big bangs”.
Though some large and important reforms have been made, these have not yet
led to a major change in the fiscal architecture that has put metropolitan finance
on a sustainable path. The 74th amendment to the Constitution empowered
urban local governments by recognizing their legal status and providing for their
expenditure powers. This had the makings of a major structural reform.
However, while expenditure responsibilities grew, no comparable revenue
expansion occurred, leaving urban local governments with a growing gap
between expenditure needs and resources available. Mohanty, et. al., using
normative estimates of expenditure needs, found the average level of
underspending to be about 75 percent. Despite the constitutional amendment,
local public services remained weak and devolution has progressed unevenly
(Mathur, 2006, Garg, 2007).
The elimination of octroi in most Indian states could have opened the door for a
revamping of local government revenue systems, but still no satisfactory revenue
productive replacement for this revenue source has been offered. Nor have other
structural reforms gone in the right direction. Some states imposed entry taxes,
which are a similar levy to octroi, and two states have abolished the property tax.
The Central Finance Commission in India is admirable for the stability and
thoughtful reform it brings to intergovernmental fiscal relations but its success is
in part because its proposals usually do not call for big changes in direction.
While the Thirteenth Finance Commission acknowledged the problems with local
government finance, it followed the constitution and left the solutions to the
states. The institution of State Finance commissions would seem to have opened
9

10

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

the door for regular review of intergovernmental fiscal structure in each state, but
this has not led to much by way of reform that would improve the position of
urban local bodies.
The introduction of JNNURM is a major change in intergovernmental transfers in
that it provides for an increased flow of funds to urban local bodies, and attempts
to use the funds as a carrot to draw out needed structural reforms. On two
counts, the JNNURM has the potential to be a major restructuring. First, it
bypasses the states in channeling more funds to the large urban governments. In
a sense it puts metropolitan finance directly in the policy agenda. Second, it aims
at inducing policy changes that will enhance the operational efficiency of urban
service delivery and stimulate revenue mobilization. On neither count has the
program been successful. Urban local governments in some states have been
slow to buy in, and the policy changes have not materialized in the way that was
hoped for (Bandyopadhyay and Rao, 2009).
OWN REVENUE MOBILIZATION
Most students of devolution argue that the low level of revenues raised by
subnational governments in developing countries is a failing of the
intergovernmental fiscal system (Bahl, Linn and Wetzel, forthcoming). The result
of heavy reliance on intergovernmental transfers is a reduced ability of local
governments to shape their expenditure budgets, less accountability of local
politicians to their constituent voters, and perhaps an inability to ratchet up the
size of government to address new needs. To the extent that local governments
do not have the expenditure discretion that comes with raising their own money,
the “lighthouse effects” from local innovations in service delivery are lost.
International Practice
Many factors stand in the way of increased revenue mobilization by local
governments. Subnational governments often have only limited legal taxing
power, but it is also the case that they often underuse the taxing power that they
do have. Central (state) governments are loathe to give up their control over the
most productive part of the tax base for fear that their own revenue mobilization
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efforts will be harmed by the competition, and elected local government leaders
are not always anxious to have the accountability that comes with increased
taxing powers.
There also is a more pure political dimension. Increased local taxing power may
enhance the success and hence visibility of local politicians, who may be present
or future political rivals. On top of this is the limited assignment of expenditure
responsibilities given to subnational governments in many developing countries,
and the ensuing argument that finance should follow function and so increased
local taxing power is not warranted. The result is that subnational government
taxes in developing countries account for an average of about 2.4 percent of GDP,
compared to 6.4 percent in industrialized countries (Table 1).5
There are important exceptions. Some low and middle income countries have
made significant improvements in the rate of revenue mobilization of large urban
governments. In Argentina, for example, the City of Buenos Aires finances over
80 percent of expenditures from own sources and the revenues of provincial and
local governments are equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP. Urban local
governments in Colombia raise revenues equivalent to 2.4 percent of national
GDP, mostly in the larger cities. In the cases of both Argentina and Colombia, the
mainstay of the local revenue system is a gross receipts tax. Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro levy a gross receipts tax on services, while Cape town, Johannesburg and
Jakarta impose a surcharge on electricity consumption. The major source of own
revenue in Mexico City is a payroll tax.
None of this is meant to say that the practice of local taxation in low and middle
income countries is free of problems. Martinez (forthcoming) gives a good
summing up of the current state of the practice: “The good news is that examples
of best practice are not scarce; the bad news is that there is still an extended
failure in applying those best practices in the vast majority of urban governments
around the world.”
5

Note that these shares include state (provincial) governments as well as local governments. Good, comparable
data on local government finance in developing countries are available for only a limited sample and only for
certain countries.
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Problems and Options for India
India is not one of the countries that has made significant strides in bringing large
urban governments into the revenue mobilization mix. The Indian system is still
characterized by a sizeable vertical imbalance at the subnational government
level that is transmitted by state governments to urban local governments. State
and local governments account for a larger percent of government spending than
revenue collections, with the gap filled by intergovernmental transfers (Rao,
2009). State and local government tax revenues are equivalent to about 15
percent of GDP which is well below the international average for developing
countries. Municipal government spending accounts for less than one percent of
GDP, and for only about 2.3 percent of total government spending (Mohanty, et.
al., 2007).
Comparable data for individual urban local governments are not readily available,
but special surveys and case studies for individual cities have shown a weakening
balance between own revenue capacity and expenditure needs. In a survey of the
finances of 34 cities for 2004, Mohanty, et. al. (2007) found that nearly all faced
annual revenue shortfalls. When revenue inflows were compared to expenditure
needs based on a normative approach to identifying minimum requirements for
service levels, the finding was that the revenue gap could not be covered with the
current revenue structure. This study finds that on average, large cities finance
about 45 percent of their expenditure from own sources, which is not a low
number by international standards, but this statistic masks the problems that
stem from the currently low level of spending.
Revenue effort. There are two routes to increasing metropolitan government
capabilities to finance budgets from own sources: raising the revenue effort that
is made by local governments, and strengthening the revenue raising powers of
local governments. Both routes can be taken in India. There is considerable
room for increased revenue effort, but vertical balance for large urban
governments almost certainly will require enhanced revenue-raising powers.
The goal of raising the revenue effort by local governments in metropolitan cities
might be addressed in a number of ways. User charges are rarely levied at cost
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recovery levels (Rao and Bird, 2011). With increased rates and stronger
enforcement, revenues could be augmented significantly. Mohanty, et.al. (2007)
studied 25 municipal corporations for 2004 and found that 16 recovered less than
20 percent of costs from charges and only 2 recovered as much as 75 percent.
The High Powered committee (2011, page 140) reports later data to show that
only 8 of the 63 JNNURM cities recovered water and sewerage O&M costs, and
only 6 recovered O&M costs for solid waste management services. The main
bottlenecks to full cost recovery with user charges are political resistance, dissatisfaction with the level of services provided, and the complications that arise
because tariff increases for urban services require state government approval.
There also is room to increase local tax effort in India. The mainstay of local
government revenue systems is the property tax, but this remains underutilized
with an effective rate against GDP at about one half the international average for
developing countries (Mathur, et. al., 2009).
Measured by almost any yardstick, the Indian property tax is badly administered.
A survey of the property tax practice in the 36 largest urban local governments,
carried out by Mathur, Thakur and Rajadhyaksha (2009), revealed that 44 percent
of all parcels are excluded from the tax net, properties are assessed at about 30
percent of market value, and the average collection rate is about 40 percent.
They show that simply raising the coverage rate and the collection rate to 85
percent will increase the urban property tax in India to a level above the
international average for low and middle income countries, though the average
effective rate would still be lower than one percent of GDP.
In some metropolitan areas, the problem is legal or structural, suggesting that a
different type of reform is needed. One example is the case of Mumbai where
rent control legislation has eroded the tax base. To try and get around the
problems of valuation and revaluation, and legal constraints on tax base growth
such as rent control, some large cities have moved to a form of area based
valuation, sometimes with success (Rao, 2008). In other cases the problem is an
unwillingness to reform the property tax, arguably because it is so unpopular with
voters. Two Indian states have abolished the property tax.
13
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Revenue structure. Improved revenue effort on the existing tax base is not likely
to be enough to establish vertical balance in the Indian system. In a study of
urban local governments, Bandyopadhyay and Rao (2009) find evidence of a
revenue gap that would exist even if these governments realized their full
revenue potential. This problem can be addressed by assigning a broad-based
revenue source to metropolitan local governments. From the international
practice, we can observe that cities in low and middle income countries that have
succeeded with developing a significant role for local revenues have done so with
a broad-based tax as a mainstay of the revenue structure. A package of
narrower based levies such as is common for local governments in developing
countries – professions tax, entertainment tax, licenses, and the like – will not
allow cities of 10 million plus populations to efficiently address their financing
problems.
The fiscal instrument of choice in most countries seems to be a turnover tax. It
has a broad base, high buoyancy and a relatively simple administration. The
problem is that it is distortive because of its cascading feature, and it can give a
great advantage to headquarters locations. Some cities – Buenos Aires and the
Brazilian cities, for example – have attempted to address these disadvantages by
including value added features, but others (Bogota, for example) seem willing to
live with the flaws because of the revenue benefits and wait for the time when
subnational government value added taxes become more feasible. The South
African metropolitan cities relied heavily on a combination payroll-turnover tax,
but this was abolished in 2010 and has not been replaced.
In the case of Indian metropolitan cities, the Octroi has been revenue
productive, but its distortive features and its all-but-impossible administrative
arrangements have led to its elimination in most places. This has significantly
weakened the rate at which large cities finance services from own revenue
sources. In Mumbai where it still is levied, octroi accounts for 45 percent of
revenues, compared to about 25 percent for the property tax (Pethe,
forthcoming).
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There is no doubt that octroi is a highly distortive levy that imposes sizeable
welfare costs on society, and on economic efficiency grounds its elimination is
welcome. Complaints from the business community have heightened the calls for
its complete elimination. But how will the lost revenues be replaced? To date,
there has not been much progress on this front. Replacement with a turnover tax
could restore lost revenues, but the distortive features would be retained. A
derivation- based sharing of the VAT with large urban governments (with a higher
local sur-rate in those cities) would be a better approach, even though it would
have some distortive features and would create some incentives for protecting
local producers. Rao and Bird (2011, p28) estimate that a one percent surcharge
on the GST base could yield an amount equivalent to 0.34 percent of GDP.6 Note
that if a metropolitan city had state government status (see below), it would
automatically receive a share of the envisioned central-state value added tax.
Arguably a better option for a broad-based local tax – at least from a point of
view of economic efficiency -- would be a payroll tax. To the extent that workers
in formal sector employment are also residents in the city, the benefits test is
passed. Such a tax can be easily collected on a place of work basis, and can be
revenue productive though much less so than in the case of a turnover tax. It
might also be levied as a surcharge on the federal income tax, so as to avoid
additional administrative costs. The problems are the informal sector, which is
not reached by such a levy, the imposition of a tax on labor in metropolitan areas
where unemployment is at very high levels, and the situation in some cities
where people are working in one jurisdiction but living in another. The ways
around the latter problem are either a piggyback arrangement on the individual
income tax, with a higher local sur-rate, and with distribution on a derivation
basis, or the levy by a large metropolitan government rather than by a city whose
taxing jurisdiction does not cover the entire area. Another major drawback to be
resolved is the headquarters problem, which exists when a firm that operates
nationally files a single return making it hard to sort out payroll amounts for
specific local areas.
6

They also caution that movement away from a uniform rate structure would complicate the administration of the
system.
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There are other forms of taxation that could significantly increase revenue
mobilization in large metropolitan cities. A better use of motor vehicle taxes
could be greatly revenue productive. Licenses, parking, tolls, and even motor
fuels are viable tax bases that can more of less pass the benefits test for local
taxation if they are correctly levied (Bahl and Linn, 1992). The base of all of these
taxes is growing. The High Powered Committee (2010, p56) pointed out that the
motor vehicle population in India increased by 100 times between 1951 and 2004.
Moreover, taxes on motor vehicles, properly structured, might be justified as
congestion charges. The problem is that this would be unpopular with certain
voter groups, would probably raise transportation costs, and it would draw some
revenues away from the state government.
Finally, there is the great potential of benefit charges, particularly those levied on
land. In addition to the annual property tax, cities could be empowered to levy
the transfer tax on real property and perhaps bring both under a uniform (or
consistent) valuation approach. Various forms of betterment charges and impact
fees could also contribute markedly to the revenue base.
A problem with all of these revenue options for metropolitan areas is the
fragmentation of the local government structure. When there are multiple local
governments operating in the same metropolitan area, the place where
consumption or employment takes place may be different from the place of
residence, and a mismatch occurs. In such cases, the property tax and benefit
charges can work effectively but broad based taxes lead to significant interjurisdictional inefficiencies (Bahl, forthcoming).
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
The financing gap for urban local governments can be reduced by an increased
flow of grants from higher to lower level governments. The justification for grant
financing of local governments is usually to redress an imbalance between
assigned expenditures and assigned taxing powers, to equalize, to correct for
some external effect, or to encourage spending in some high priority area. There
also are political reasons. Some elected local leaders see grants as a less risky
political strategy than local taxation, and some elected state and central leaders
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see grants as a way to preserve their near-monopoly on broad based taxes and
their degree of control over how the revenues are spent. Whatever the reason,
intergovernmental transfers usually play a large role in the financing of
subnational governments in most low and middle income countries. (Bird, 2006,
Boadway and Shah, 2009).
International Practice
Countries vary widely in terms of how they structure their grant systems, and how
they treat large urban governments. Consider the following examples drawn from
the unitary countries. The Chinese emphasize economic development and the
main transfer instrument is shared taxes that are allocated on a derivation basis.
The provincial and local governments have no independent taxing powers. South
Africa, on the other hand, allocates its transfers by an equalization formula and
the largest metropolitan local governments receive little in grant revenues. Both
Indonesia and the Philippines share a substantial portion of national taxes with
local governments, with the allocation being by an objective formula that seems
to favor local governments where expenditure needs are greater. Colombia
operates a system of conditional grants to local governments, where the central
government strictly controls the use of the funds.
There is also a lot of variation in the practice among federal countries. Pakistan
and Argentina channel grants through one large program with a formula that
emphasizes population. The grants are made directly to the provincial
governments. Mexico’s grant system has a conditional and an unconditional
sector, of about equal size.
What these few examples show is that countries structure their grant systems
according to what they intend for these transfers to accomplish. In some
countries, the metropolitan governments receive a significant share of the
transfers (e.g., China), but in others the metropolitan governments raise most of
the revenues from their own sources (South Africa and Argentina).
Indian Practice
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Transfers to state governments in India are made through three channels: Finance
Commission grants, Development grants, and centrally sponsored schemes. The
Finance Commission has recommended heavier allocations to local governments,
but the decision is left to the state governments, with advice from their planning
commissions, to decide whether to do this and if so, how it should be done. In all
of this, there would not appear to be an urban strategy.
The JNNURM is a program of direct federal aid to large cities. This program does
appear to be a strategy to address the infrastructure needs of urban areas, and
also to provide local governments with incentives to undertake needed structural
reforms. The amounts of assistance involved under this program are significant,
and the policy reforms sought are important. But in its first iteration, the
program suffered from design flaws. Most importantly, the proposed policy
reforms did into materialize in many cases, and there was no conditionality built
into the grant flow. Disbursement of the funds was slow, in part because of the
matching requirement and in part because of the limited capacity of the local
governments to implement the projects and the policy reforms.
Reform options
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers will play an important role in filling the
financing gap for metropolitan governments in India. Two streams of transfers
might be considered. First, a reformed JNNURM, adequately funded and with
conditionality on the policy reforms, and with provision for capacity development,
could be a cornerstone of the financing program for metropolitan cities. Second,
state governments could finally take seriously the mandate of forming competent
State finance Commissions and relying on their recommendations. The Central
Finance commission recommendation, that a share of state revenues be allocated
to urban local bodies, would be a welcome addition to a national urban strategy.
Under other strategies, the level of intergovernmental transfers to metropolitan
cities might be of a lesser magnitude. One scenario, proposed by the High
Powered Commission (2011) would have urban local services financed by a
combination of higher own source revenues and an upgraded JNNURM. Under a
scenario where some metropolitan cities gain state government status (see
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below), the city- state would receive a share of all forms of intergovernmental
transfer.
CITY-STATES
Another approach to addressing the urban fiscal problem is to move large cities to
state government status. At once this takes away some of the roadblocks to
increased revenue raising powers, it resolves much of the government
fragmentation problem, and it restores fiscal autonomy to local governments.
The International Practice7
Historically, city-states have been among the most successful jurisdictions in
producing rapid economic growth and effective urban growth. Medieval Venice
and the cities of the Hanseatic League in Northern Europe are early examples.
Hong Kong and Singapore are the contemporary counterparts. An interesting
question is whether there are lessons to be learned for metropolitan governance
and finance from the experience of the city-states and whether there is a way to
pattern metropolitan governance at least partially after that model.
In larger countries, this could take the form of provincial cities, where the
metropolitan area local government has both provincial and local status. For
example in China, the four largest cities are treated as provinces and have the
powers of both provincial government and local government. The same is true in
the case of Jakarta and Mexico City. In many (most) countries, the capital city is
treated as a special case and its financing structure is different from other local
governments. Delhi, Islamabad and Washington DC are examples. In yet other
cases, the metropolitan cities are singled out as a category and given special
treatment, including perhaps more taxing and borrowing powers and less access
to intergovernmental transfers. The South African metropolitan cities, the largest
Colombian cities and Buenos Aires are examples.
There are some clear advantages to this approach. It allows for area wide
governance that can internalize potential external effects, but also allows for
7

See Bahl, Linn and Wetzel, forthcoming
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significant autonomy in making budgetary decisions. The metropolitan
government becomes much like a state in a federation, but usually with more
manageable boundaries and without the understructure of local governments to
deal with. A further advantage is that its boundaries can be large enough to
allow regional taxation, and perhaps to adopt a broad based tax. Finally, its
borrowing powers can be enhanced because it can oversee and regulate larger
public enterprises and because its revenue base can support debt better than if it
were a city government within a metropolitan area or subject to provincial
oversight.
There also are disadvantages. For one, the metropolitan area may have already
spread across jurisdiction boundaries so that the city-province status is assigned
to the core city. In this case, the area wide governance advantage is lost. This is
the case of Buenos Aires. Another disadvantage is the hinterland problem, e.g.,
the creation of a set of “special cities” in China led to harming the fiscal position
of the “residual province by removing its most important revenue generator. A
third disadvantage is that City-states are an ad hoc arrangement, created as
special cases by the central government. How does one draw the line for deciding
if there will be more, and how will the provincial city be made to fit within the
existing local government code or budget law? Finally, a city state may be
politically strong, with a governor or mayor, who might be considered a rival by
the central government and the Legislature. This can lead to some degree of
discrimination against the metropolitan area in terms of its treatment within the
metropolitan area.
The Practice Applied to India
The city-state approach could be adopted in India. Under such a scheme, a
designated set of large cities would be given state government status. The
general argument is that the large metropolitan areas are very different from the
rest of their states, and governance might be more efficient if they were given
sate government status. Certainly the list would include Mumbai, and likely there
would be other candidates.
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To illustrate the city-state approach, we take the example of metropolitan
Mumbai. The state of Maharashtra would be divided into two states:
metropolitan Mumbai and the remainder of Maharashtra. There would be no
hierarchical relationship between the two. Both states would be represented in
the national Parliament, following the normal rules. The new city-states would
have the same constitutional fiscal powers as any other state. This means that
these cities would be empowered to levy VAT, property tax, automobile –related
taxes, etc. In short, their taxing powers and access to revenues could be
dramatically increased. So would their expenditure responsibilities, as
Maharashtra state level programs within these cities (including parastatals) would
be turned over to the new Mumbai state. Those presently responsible for
administering state level activities within Mumbai would be shifted to the new
state. Properly planned, this transition could be accomplished without major
service level disruptions.8
An interesting case of such a transfer of powers is Indonesia where most
government services were transferred from deconcentrated central departments
to local governments, without a major disruption in service levels (Hofman and
Kaiser, 2004). In all, about 2 million employees were transferred from central
government to local government control.

The “residual state” of Maharashtra would continue on with the remainder
of their urban and rural local bodies, just as under the present regime. However,
it would no longer could collect taxes within the Mumbai metropolitan area, nor
would it share taxes, make grants, be responsible for service delivery, or have
the power to make regulatory decisions. Both of the states would be represented
in the national congress but Maharashtra’s representation would be reduced
because of the loss of metropolitan Mumbai from its jurisdiction. Both the
residual Maharashtra and Mumbai would have a representative state legislative
body and independent elections.
8

This is not to say that the transition would be without problems or that it would be costless. And, at a later
period, the new city- state would want to exercise an option of deciding how many employees to retain and how
to establish their seniority.
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The Central Finance Commission would treat the new state just as it would any
other state, though, admittedly, the formula allocations and equalization
provisions might require some new thinking. Maharashtra would continue on
with a state finance commission, and it would have the same responsibilities, i.e.,
to recommend the structure of the intergovernmental fiscal system within the
state. In the case of Mumbai, the state finance commission would focus more on
the relationship between the new state and its underlying deconcentrated units
or wards.
Impacts: Advantages
There is much to be gained from a new fiscal architecture that includes citystates. It would be part of a long run solution rather than a patchwork solution to
the very real problem of service level provision, infrastructure financing and slum
upgrading. A number of specific gains might be highlighted.



Local voters would have a greater influence on the level and mix of
public services provided within the urban area (state). In theory, this
will allow the local government in Mumbai to better take advantage
of local knowledge in deciding on the package of services to be
delivered. The result should be more voter satisfaction with services,
and more willingness to pay for services.



Revenue mobilization in the city- state could increase. This is
because the city would have access to all the formerly state taxes,
and could levy these on an area-wide basis, and because the demand
for local services would be high because of all of the functions that
had been absorbed. Local voters would have a greater influence on
the level and mix of public services provided within the urban area
(state). This could lead to increased local revenue effort.



Local government officials would become more accountable to their
local constituents for the quality of services delivered, because they
would impose taxes and user charges on their constituents. For this
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reason, elected local officials might be divided in their support for
this change to the fiscal architecture.


Those who live and invest in Mumbai probably be subject to higher
taxes than those who live and do business in other urban areas. This
seems an advantage because it would force those living in larger
urban areas to pay the marginal servicing cost that they impose on
their governments.



Mumbai would now have a dedicated revenue stream that would
allow them to show repayment potential for loans.



Because Maharashtra state would no longer be required to deal with
metropolitan Mumbai, it may have more degrees of freedom in
designing the transfer system to be more equalizing. The mega cities
are different enough from the rest of the state that fitting it into the
intergovernmental fiscal system is an ongoing challenge.

Impacts: Disadvantages and Challenges
There also are major disadvantages to creating provincial cities. Most
important, it is a radical change in the fiscal architecture, and would be resisted
on grounds that big changes disrupt a longstanding state of affairs. Some would
argue that the stability of the intergovernmental fiscal system in India has served
it well. On the other hand, there are precedents for this in recent Indian history
when three new states were created in the 1980s.


The major problem would be the changed fiscal situation of the
“residual” state of Maharashtra. It would lose the tax base in its
major city, hence would suffer a huge revenue loss with respect to
shared taxes and VAT. This would be offset to some extent by
reduced expenditure responsibility for service provision in the largest
city, and probably by larger transfers from the CFC awards. There
23
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might also be a contingency transfer to protect services in the
residual state for a transition period. Still, “residual Maharashtra”
would be weaker economically and would have less political force
than it does now.



The creation of state-level cities would be politically difficult. It
would disturb many existing arrangements and power structures. In
particular, state politicians and bureaucrats in the residual states
would lose power. They would be working with a smaller budget and
less resources to improve services to their constituent districts. State
level bureaucrats would find their staff reduced as many line ministry
officials will have been devolved to the new state. There also would
be a threat to elected local officials in Mumbai and to former
members of the state parliament from the former Mumbai districts.
Local politicians would be put in a position to make unpopular taxing
decisions, and some might prefer the present arrangement where
they rely heavily on transfers to finance their budgets.



The net fiscal effect on the residual state would likely be negative.
This would leave the state in a position of being less able to fund
vertical programs and to equalize. To the extent there is now an
urban-rural transfer, this would be markedly lessened if Mumbai
were removed from Maharashtra. Rural local governments could be
a net fiscal loser under this policy reform. There would be increased
pressure on the state government to increase its effective tax rate.



There is also some risk with respect to establishing fiscal
management and structure of the new state. The present
deconcentrated state apparatus for service delivery may not function
as well under a city administration as a state administration, at least
during the transition period. Moreover, the vertical fiscal balance in
a new Mumbai State might be weakened, at least initially, by the
goal of making it more self-sufficient in terms of financing. Local
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voters might rebel against the necessary higher level of taxes and
user charges.

The creation of a city-state would be a Federal government matter,
and the policies and implementation would be set at the central
government level. A particularly difficult issue will be the method
used to draw the boundaries of the new city-state. The most likely
choice would be based on the concept of a labor market area, as was
done in South Africa. An alternative is that the new city state could
follow the existing boundaries of incorporated municipalities in
which case it would be analogous to annexation or consolidation.


There may be some disruptions in federal revenue sharing
arrangements. The CFC awards might require rethinking, as well as
development assistance and central schemes. Depending on the
outcomes, fiscal disparities between Mumbai state and the rest of
the nation may need to be addressed.



A particularly difficult issue will be how to stem the tide of demands
for city-state status, e.g., Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore,
and others. Most large urban areas in India probably feel
discriminated against and many would see this new governmental
arrangement as a way to reduce the flow of money from their tax
base to support services provided elsewhere. Others may argue for a
change in their governance status in order to capture rents. In
countries where the fiscal architecture has been changed
dramatically, subnational governments have succeeded in changing
their status in order to gain some advantages from the
intergovernmental transfer system. Indonesia is an example.
(Hofman and Kaiser, 2003)
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The cost of government might increase with the creation of state
level cities, at least in the initial period. For example, a “residual
“state of Maharashtra would be smaller and with less expenditure
responsibility, so it should be able to reduce government
employment and overhead. But such costs are sticky downward. On
the other hand, a new city- state might increase its spending
dramatically to address a backlog of unmet needs, but the cost
increases might be held back by the requirement of more selffinancing.

CONCLUSIONS
While revenues do not match expenditure needs at any level of Indian
government, a particularly critical problem has emerged in the case of large cities
where infrastructure is inadequate and promises to grow more so with expected
high rates of migration. In recent years, the federal government has recognized
the urban government finance problem with programmatic assistance and policy
advice, but state governments have been slow to follow this lead. It would be fair
to say that a coherent strategy for metropolitan finances has not been
implemented. The approach continues to be one of muddling through with
various policies that have independent effects at the margin, rather than with a
comprehensive strategy that involves a fundamental change in the fiscal
architecture.
The implementation of a comprehensive metropolitan fiscal strategy is a
possibility for India, but it would be politically difficult and would involve some
costs that might be unacceptable on social as well as economic grounds. Such a
strategy would have the objective of making the metropolitan cities more
financially self-sufficient, and giving them more control over their budgets. It
might have three legs: redrawing metropolitan government boundaries, assigning
more revenue raising powers to metropolitan governments than to other local
governments, and limiting transfers to metropolitan governments to those that
are designed to address externalities and equity concerns.
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In many respects, India operates as a traditional federalism with state
governments controlling the fiscal powers of third tier local governments. While
municipalities have been empowered in terms of their expenditure
responsibilities, there has been little movement by state governments to
implement a strategy that would give them more budgetary self-sufficiency.
Some large metropolitan areas could be converted to city-states, i.e., be given
state government status. This would create a taxing district that is roughly
coterminous with the labor market area, and the metropolitan government would
have access to all state government tax bases and user charge bases. Revenue
raising powers would be extended to include all present state government taxes.
Independence in revenue raising powers would be extended to motor vehicle
taxes and various forms of development charges, and the metropolitan local
government would have freedom to raise user charges to whatever rate they
chose. The revised JNNURM would grow in size and be the major
intergovernmental transfer in the revenue system.
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Table1.1 Fiscal Decentralization: International Comparisons for the 2000sa
Subnational Government
Subnational Government Taxes
Expenditures
Region
Percent of Total
Percent of GDP Percent of Total Percent of GDP
Government
Taxes
Expenditures
Developing
18.8
5.1
11.4
2.3
countriesb
(16)
(20)
(16)
(20)
Industrial
27.8
13.9
22.7
6.4
countries
(26)
(26)
(24)
(25)
Source: Bahl, Linn and Wetzel (forthcoming) drawn from IMF (various years) and estimates
drawn from the case studies by Roy Bahl.
Note: Data reported are unweighted averages for the 2000s for years in which data are
reported.
a. The number in parenthesis shows the number of countries included in the comparison.
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